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Abstract
This article addresses the reactions of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)
economies to external shocks. Unlike the existing economic integration projects, the UNASUR
was conceived as a political alliance. Because the recent euro debt crisis confirmed the impor-
tance of political agreement for economic integration, the South American plan is likely to be
promising. However, economic and political aspects must go hand in hand for an integration
project to succeed. Thus, assessing the UNASUR from an economic perspective is essential.
Using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) approach, this paper measures the impact of
three external shocks (monetary, commercial and financial) in the real, monetary and fiscal eco-
nomic sector of seven UNASUR economies, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru
and Venezuela, and detects for co-movement paths. The results reveal a non-negligible current
synchronization level across the studied economies, confirm their high external vulnerability
and identify mutual weaknesses to overcome.
Keywords: Economic integration, South America, Structural VAR, UNASUR
JEL classification: C32, E42, F41
1 Introduction
Economic integration appears to be a new global trend. Nations in Asia, Europe, Africa
and America have joined forces seeking macroeconomic stability. Thus, the last century has
witnessed the formation of several economic unions: the ASEAN+3 (Association of South-
East Asian Nations together with China, Japan and Korea – 1997), the Eurozone – 1999, the
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC-EMCCA – 1998), the West
African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA-WAEMU – 1994), the Southern African
Development Community (SADC – 1992), the East African Community (EAC– 2000) and the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR – 2008). Economic integration as a strategy for
macroeconomic stability appeared to work well in Europe after the euro was launched (Sapir,
2011), until the eruption of the European sovereign debt crisis revealed the weaknesses of an
economic union without a political union.
The South American case deserves special attention because, unlike the other blocs, the
UNASUR emerged as a political alliance. The UNASUR Constitutive Treaty, signed in 2008 and
ratified in 2011, formalizes the union as an entity with international juridical character gathering
twelve independent nations for regional integration in cultural, social, economic and political
fields.1 Furthermore, the UNASUR is conceived as a strategy for improving the condition
of nations with a common history of economic instability and external dependence. Indeed,
common concerns and political willingness exist within the group; however, is that enough?
Because the recent euro debt crisis confirmed the importance of political agreement (Sapir,
2011), the South American plan could be considered promising. Notwithstanding, this project
is likely to fail if the concerned economies do not converge economically. The latest lessons
regarding the major role of political issues do not erase the necessity of economic coincidences
for integration. On the contrary, economic and political aspects must go hand in hand for
an integration project to succeed. Therefore, this study assesses the integration project of
the UNASUR from an economic integration perspective. The study focuses on the effects of
external shocks on members’ economies considering thereby one of the motivations for joining
together: the reduction of external vulnerabilities.
Accordingly, this paper measures the impact of three external shocks (monetary, commercial
1Arts. 1 and 2 in the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty.
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and financial) in the real, monetary and fiscal economic sector of seven UNASUR economies,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, and detects for co-movement
paths. Moreover, it quantifies the relative importance of external shocks for each studied coun-
try and compares the reactions of monetary and fiscal stabilization tools in order to elucidate
future challenges of the UNASUR project. The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, a struc-
tural Bayesian vector autoregression (SVAR) model is built for each studied economy (seven
UNASUR members) and each retained disturbance (three external shocks). Second, a corre-
lation exercise is performed to detect patterns of real, monetary and fiscal convergence. And
third, the forecast error variance decomposition information is used to identify the principal
sources of vulnerability and to provide comparative measures.
The modeling strategy relies on structural Bayesian vector autoregression (SVAR) models.
This strategy makes it possible to impose identifying restrictions on the relationships between
the model’s variables, in reference to economic theory (Sims, 1986), and thus ensures a better
interpretation of results. Furthermore, the Bayesian estimation techniques avoid any misleading
result from an improper treatment of series with unit roots (Sims, 1988) and to provide a robust
measure of uncertainty (Sims and Zha, 1999).
As such, the existing literature is extended in three directions. First, this paper covers a
considerable number of South American economies, some of them rarely considered by the lit-
erature. Despite the fact that researchers have long been intrigued by the topic of similarity in
the impact of shocks and convergence, for the South American case, studies have particularly
focused on specific subsets of UNASUR economies, notably on MERCOSUR (i.e., Allegret and
Sand, 2009a; Busse, Hefeker, and Koopmann, 2006; Camarero, Jr., and Tamarit, 2006; de An-
drade, Silva, and Trautwein, 2005; Gimet, 2007a,b). Second, this study incorporates a wide
extent of external disturbances for the region. To date, authors have mainly concentrated on the
effects of exogenous monetary and commercial shocks (Ahmed, 2003; Canova, 2005; Mackowiak,
2007) leaving the study of external financial disturbances restricted to a few economies (Alle-
gret and Sand, 2009b). This fact is important to the extent that, given the recent sub-prime
crisis, international financial disturbances have proven to be crucial for countries belonging to
a group (Gimet, 2011). Third, by including fiscal domestic variables, this article considers the
lessons of the current European sovereign-debt crisis (Eichengreen, 2012; Issing, 2011) about
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the major role of fiscal adjustments regarding integration concerns.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the modeling strategy and presents
the data and variables. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the results, and section 5 concludes.
2 An Empirical Analysis
The modeling strategy relies on a Bayesian estimation of structural vector autoregressive
(SVAR) models to determine the impact of external shocks on the real economies of Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. This strategy ensures the reliability of
results because of two main aspects. On the one hand, the use of SVAR models makes it
possible to impose identifying restrictions on relationships between the model’s variables, in
reference to economic theory (Sims, 1986), and, therefore, ensures a better interpretation of
results. In fact, the SVAR approach has been used extensively in applied macroeconomics in
response to Sims’s criticism (1980) of unidentified vector autoregression (VAR) models. The
SVAR model allows to capture not only the joint dynamics of multiple time series – as the
VAR models do – but also the simultaneous interactions between the series, thus constituting
a powerful tool to study economic market interactions.
On the other hand, the Bayesian inference provides a gain in accuracy related to the so-called
“frequentist” or “classical” methods (See, i.e., Bewley, 2002; Litterman, 1984, 1986; Ribeiro-
Ramos, 2003; Sims, 1988). The Bayesian method not only overcomes the over-parameterization
problem associated with the estimation of VAR models, but also corrects the coefficient bias
when time series are non-stationary and provides a reliable measure of uncertainty about es-
timations.2 In fact, the Bayesian estimation is unaffected by the presence of unit roots (Sims,
1988), typically present in economic time series. Hence, the Bayesian estimation makes it
possible to avoid any misleading result from an improper treatment of non-stationary (or coin-
tegrated) variables and to directly identify the impact of shocks in the path of macro-series
when working with level series. Furthermore, the Bayesian technique of inference provides a
reliable measure of uncertainty for the estimated models (e.g., Litterman, 1986) and enables
2As a law, VAR models require a large number of parameters to be estimated. Some of the parameters are
not significant resulting in multicollinearity and a loss of degrees of freedom, which could lead to inefficient
estimates and large out-of-sample forecasting errors. The Bayesian inference shrinks parameters using priors,
thus reducing the problem of over-parameterization (Doan, Litterman, and Sims, 1983; Litterman, 1980, 1986;
Tood, 1984)
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to compute likelihood-based error bands which have proven to be the best approach to provide
error bands in time series models (Sims and Zha, 1999).
The above aspects justify the pertinence of the modeling strategy.
2.1 The Structural VAR Framework
The modeling approach assumes that each UNASUR economy can be described by the linear
simultaneous p’th-order difference-equation model of the form3
A0xt = A1xt−1 + · · ·+ Apxt−p + εt
A(L)xt = εt (1)
With
εt|xs, s < t ∼ N(0, I) (2)
Where xt is a n x 1 vector of endogenous variables at time t, L is the lag operator and p is a
finite-order lag length. A0 is a n x n matrix that summarizes the contemporaneous relationships
between the variables, and εt is the n x 1 vector of structural disturbances. A0 is assumed to
be non-singular, such that (1) provides a complete description of the conditional distribution
of yt given ys, s < t and can be solved by multiplying through on the left by A
−1
0 to produce
the reduced form
xt = B1xt−1 + · · ·+Bpxt−p + µt
B(L)xt = µt (3)
in which B0 = I and µt is a white noise representing the vector of canonical disturbances n x
1 whose variance-covariance matrix is not restricted (i.e., while still uncorrelated with past xt,
has a non-diagonal covariance matrix), thus assuming a normal conditional distribution of xt,
µt ∼ iidN(0,Σ).
The canonical (µt) and the structural disturbances (εt) are linked by the relationship
A0µt = εt (4)
3This representation corresponds to Sims and Zha (1999) parameterization.
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Thus, Σ is given by
E(µt, µ
′
t) = A
−1
0 E(εt, ε
′
t)A
T−1
0 = (A0A
′
0)
−1 = Σ
Furthermore, the response functions of xt to structural shocks εt for the model are the
coefficients in the lag operator C(L) of the infinite-order polynomial representation
xt = B
−1(L)µt = B−1(L)A−10 εt = C(L)εt
This framework implies that n2 structural parameters need to be recovered from the reduced
form. Because Σ is symmetric, this recovery is possible only for n(n+1)/2 parameters. Thus,
the model identification requires the imposition of at least n(n-1)/2 restrictions. The short-run
constraints are imposed directly on A0 in (4) and correspond to some elements of the matrix
set to zero.
Because the purpose is to study the short-run effects of external disturbances in UNASUR
economies, only short-run restrictions are used to identify the SVAR models. As detailed later,
the model identification will result in over-identified SVARs. Hence, Sims and Zha (1999)
parameterization for over-identified systems is retained here to assert a posterior-integrable
function and a correct calculation of likelihood-based error bands. Sims and Zha (1999) pa-
rameterization corresponds to the following likelihood function:
q(B,Σ) = |A0|T exp
{
1
2
tr(A0A
′
0S(B̂))−
1
2
tr((B − B̂)′XX ′(B − B̂)A0A′0)
}
µ̂(t, B) = B(L)xt
S(B) =
T∑
t=1
µ̂(t, B)µ̂(t, B)
′
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2.2 Variables and Data
Quarterly data covering the period from 1993Q1 to 2010Q4 for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela is employed to construct individual SVARs models.45 In order
to measure the impact of external shocks in the real, monetary and fiscal economic sector of
each country, six domestic variables (two real, two monetary and two fiscal) and three external
variables are selected.
In the model, each studied economy is described by the endogenous variables vector xt:
x
′
t = (extt, yt, rert, rt,mt, deft, debtt)
The first variable represents the external factor (extt) whose impact on the local economies
is analyzed. The other six variables capture the domestic reactions. The local real economic
sector is represented by the real gross domestic product (yt) and the real exchange rate (rert)
(indirect quotation).6 The monetary variables are the short-run nominal interest rate (rt) and
the money supply M1 (mt). The inclusion of both interest rate and monetary aggregate M1
allows to capture the monetary policy response of either an inflation or monetary targeting
economy. Finally, the public deficit-GDP ratio (deft) and the external public debt-GDP ratio
(debtt) are included to add the fiscal dimension (Bruneau and De Bandt, 2003; Nishigaki, 2009).
This variable choice is closely related to the typical choice in an IS-LM-BP framework (e.g.,
Gali, 1992) augmented with the two fiscal variables. The fiscal variables are included to consider
the major role of fiscal policy regarding integration concerns, which has been indicated by the
Eurozone crisis (Eichengreen, 2012; Issing, 2011).
To better capture the external vulnerabilities, three external shocks are introduced through
the variable extt. The U.S. federal funds rate (r usat), the world commodity price index (ext pt)
and the MSCI index (mscit), which represent the external monetary, commercial and financial
environment, respectively.7
4The data sources are the IMF’s International Financial statistic database, the Inter-American Development
Bank and several national central banks.
5The sample is restricted to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela because of the
availability of reliable data. This sample is representative to the extent that it accounts for 96.61% of the total
UNASUR GDP, according to the World Economic Outlook Database for April 2012.
6Indirect quotation: Units of national currency for one unit of US dollar.
7The MSCI World Index is a free float-adjusted market-capitalization-weighted index that is designed to
measure the equity market performance of developed markets. The Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI) World Index consists of the following 24 developed market country indices: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
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The inclusion of the monetary dimension through the U.S federal fund rate has been a
common exercise in literature. This approach is even more pertinent for the South Ameri-
can region because of its historical dependence on the United States (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003).
However, it is worth to mention that, lately, this trend appears to be reversing. Some South
American countries – e.g., Brazil (Goldfajn and Minella, 2007) – are reducing their debts from
the U.S. and are seeking alternative ways of financing. Moreover, Chinese investment in Latin
America has become so influential that it is changing the traditional U.S dependency of the
region (Kotschwar, Moran, and Muir, 2012). Notwithstanding, this changing trend is beyond
the scope of this analysis, and the U.S. federal fund rate is assumed to be the most influential
source of monetary external disturbances for South America.
UNASUR countries are commodity exporting economies (data on this shall be present in
the next section), therefore, the world commodity price index is included to analyse the impact
of foreign commercial disturbances.8 In fact, the commodity price disturbances have proven to
have a significant influence on the real economic sector of commodity exporters (e.g., Collier and
Goderis, 2012; Medina, 2010). Moreover, some commodities, notably gold, act as safe havens
in times of crises (Roache and Rossi, 2010), which increases the volatility of the commodity
exporters’ income, it is thus expected the analyzed economies to be highly vulnerable to a
commodity prices innovation.
The selection of the MSCI world index corresponds to the usual choice in the literature to
proxy the global financial environment (e.g., Abugri, 2008; Ulku and Ikizlerlic, 2012).
The inclusion not only of monetary and commercial shocks, as traditional in literature (e.g.,
Canova, 2005; Mackowiak, 2007), but also of financial shocks permits this study to go beyond
the traditional approach and thus to capture more appropriately the vulnerability to which the
studied economies are exposed to.
Consequently, the correspondent structural disturbances vector is
ε
′
t = (εext,t, ε2,t, ε3,t, ε4,t, ε5,t, ε6,t, ε7,t)
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
8This choice is also usual in literature (e.g., Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez, Morales-Zumaquero, and E´gert, 2010; Makin,
2012).
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Where εext represents consecutively the external monetary policy shock, the international
trade shock and the foreign financial shock. The remaining structural disturbances (εi,t for
i = 2, ..., 7) do not need to be economically identified, because the focus is on analyzing the
effect of the external disturbance εext,t on domestic variables’ dynamics.
All series are logged, except for r usat, rt, deft and debtt that are measured in percent.
The variables are seasonally adjusted if required. The models are constructed with level series,
regardless of the presence of unit roots or cointegration relationships, which is possible thanks
to the Bayesian inference. In fact, the utilization of Bayesian techniques enables us to estimate
models that are not affected by the presence of unit roots (Sims, 1988; Sims and Uhlig, 1991)
and to make direct behavioral interpretations. The traditional information criteria (Akaike,
Schwartz, Hanna-Quinn) are used to test for the appropriate lag order. According to these
criteria, the series’ dynamics are well described by SVARs(2).9
2.3 SVAR Identification: Short-run restrictions
The identification of the model requires the imposition of n(n-1)/2 restrictions (See section
2.1), i.e., twenty-one in this study because seven variables are included. Because of the short-
term scope of this study, only contemporaneous restrictions are imposed and the impact of the
external disturbances on each UNASUR economy is analyzed in a period of four years after the
shock (16 periods).
The following equation summarizes the identification scheme retained which links the canon-
ical (µt) and the structural innovations (εt).
A0µt = εt
a11 0 0 0 0 0 0
a21 a22 0 0 0 0 0
a31 a32 a33 0 0 0 0
a41 a42 a43 a44 0 0 0
a51 a52 a53 a54 a55 0 0
a61 a62 a63 a64 a65 a66 0
a71 a72 a73 a74 a75 a76 a77


µext,t
µy,t
µrer,t
µr,t
µm,t
µdef,t
µdebt,t

=

εext,t
ε2,t
ε3,t
ε4,t
ε5,t
ε6,t
ε7,t

As only the external shock needs to be identified, the only assumption retained for our
purposes is that the studied UNASUR economies are small open economies. Thus, the external
9All the tests are available upon request to the author.
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variable is exogenous a12 = a13 = a14 = a15 = a16 = a17 = 0 (Gimet, 2011; Mackowiak, 2007).
As 21 restrictions are needed to achieve exact identification of the system, a triangular schema
(a` la Cholesky) is retained for the matrix of contemporaneous relationships between variables,
A0. The coefficients are estimated using Bayesian techniques and likelihood-based error bands
are computed following Sims and Zha (1999).10 Moreover, alternative identifications of the
model have been tested confirming the robustness of results.11
3 The Results
The impulse response functions after each external shock are illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and
3. These figures display the responses of domestic variables to a variation of one standard
deviation of the external variables. Error bands are computed using a Monte Carlo integration
method.12 A response is significant if its corresponding confidence interval does not include the
zero axis. Tables 2, 4 and 5 display the forecast-error variance decomposition.
3.1 Impact of a restrictive U.S. monetary policy shock
Domestic reactions after an external monetary policy shock depend on the exchange regime
and the financial integration of each country. Regarding exchange-rate-regime concerns, two
subgroups can be identified. The countries that have opted for fixed regimes include Argentina,
Bolivia and Venezuela, and the so-called FIT (Floating Inflation Targeters) economies include
Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru (See Table 1). An increase of the external interest rate is
expected to be reflected directly in the local interest rate of the first group (Canova, 2005).
On the contrary, floating countries are expected to adjust through the exchange-rate channel
(Kim and Roubini, 2000). However, these theoretical expectations are not entirely reflected in
the results due to the presence of flexible hybrid systems (dirty float) within the FIT countries
and restrictions to free capital movements within the fixed-exchange-rate countries. Chile is
the only pure floater, according to the IMS De Facto Classification for 2011; all the other FIT
10Sims and Zha’s (1999) parameterization assures the obtaining of an integrable posterior function, necessary
for computing impulse-responses.
11Non-recursive identification schemes for the A0 matrix do not change results of interest as long as the
exogenous character of the external variable is retained as assumption (a12 = a13 = a14 = a15 = a16 = a17 = 0).
12Computed by montesvar.src procedure. Estima-RATS. Error bands correspond to the 0.16% and 0.84%
fractiles, i.e., a confidence interval of 68%. (Sims and Zha 1999)
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economies are classified as “managed floaters” (Table 1). Moreover, Argentina and Venezuela
legally regulate all transactions in foreign currencies, the theoretical assumption of no capital
controls is thus not present.13
Insert Table 1 here
The low degree of financial integration of Argentina and Venezuela is confirmed by the
Chinn-Ito index.14 For 2010, the index ranks Venezuela as the most-closed economy (165th)
over a total of 165 countries; Argentina ranks 106th. In contrast, the FIT economies are
ranked among the most open. Peru is on top (1st) followed by Chile (62th), Brazil (90th)
and Colombia (98th). The high degree of capital-account openness of Brazil, Chile, Colombia
and Peru is consistent with their exchange rate regimes (managed or pure float) according
to the well-known impossible trinity.15 This trilemma justifies Argentina (currency board)
and Venezuela’s (adjustable peg) necessity to impose capital controls. Bolivia’s case is not
well defined because even though the country is more open than some FIT countries (89th)
and its exchange regime is fixed, Bolivian monetary policy objectives have never been clearly
announced. This discretionary monetary policy makes it difficult to anticipate results.
Insert Figure 1 here
The aforementioned is indicated by the different reactions and degrees of vulnerability within
the UNASUR after a restrictive monetary policy shock from the United States (Figure 1 and
Table 2). Overall, FIT economies appear to stabilize better than countries with fixed regimes
(i.e., Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela). A general examination of Table 2 indicates less impact
of the shock on FIT countries’ domestic variables.
The local interest rates’ (i) responses are particularly interesting. The interest rates decrease
contemporaneously in the fixed exchange rate countries – contrary to the expected increase. The
short-lived and weak reactions (not more than 5% of the contemporaneous fluctuation explained
13Argentinean law 19.359 establishes different degrees of constraints for transactions involving currency trans-
fers to and from abroad. Likewise, in Venezuela, the CADIVI (Commission for the Administration of Currency
Exchange) regulates all the purchases and sales of foreign currency and administrates the monthly allocation
of foreign currency decided by the Central Bank of Venezuela. Moreover, the government bonds in dollars
are traded through a public system so-called SITME (Transaction System for Foreign Currency Denominated
Securities).
14Both measures of financial integration, the volume-based index of Lane and Milesi-Ferreti and the Chinn-
Ito index (kaopen), are commonly used in the literature. The Chinn-Ito index was retained because of the
availability of updated information for 2010.
15The trilemma or impossible trinity affirms that a country cannot simultaneously have exchange rate stability,
monetary independence and full financial integration. A country must give up one of the mentioned goals (See
Frankel, 1999).
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by the shock – Table 2) indicate the success of rigorous controls of capital flows in attenuating
vulnerability despite dollar-pegged regimes. In contrast, domestic interest rates in FIT countries
increase after the shock. Peru, as the most financially integrated economy, has the strongest
increase in interest rates. Brazil and Chile’s reactions, although positive and significant, are
weak and fleeting. Literature has attributed Brazilian and Chilean invulnerability to a well-
framed and credible monetary policy resulting in their ability to redress the economy and to
insulate against shocks (Mackowiak, 2007). The poor sensibility of Brazil and Chile can be also
imputed to their actual positioning in global economy. In one hand, Brazil has been catalogued
by the IMF as the largest Latin American economy and one of the five most important emerging
countries of the world (BRICS member). Moreover, Brazil accounts for more than 50% of the
aggregate South American GDP according to the World Bank. On the other hand, Chile is the
most stable economy in the region (Edwards, 2007) and the only South American member of
the OCDE.
Insert Table 2 here
The monetary variables (r and m) perfectly reflect the monetary policy tools employed
by each country according to their monetary policy strategies. FIT economies adjust through
interest rates (i), whereas the fixed exchange rate economies adjust through the monetary ag-
gregate (m) (Devereux, 2004). Figure 1 shows a significant reaction of i and non-significant
reactions of m and vice versa. The first tactic appears to be superior: Argentina and Bolivia’s
real sector is much more sensitive than Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru’s real sector. Strik-
ingly, Venezuela’s real sector does not react; in this case, the country’s closed borders act as a
perfect anti-external shocks shield.
Independently of the individual monetary policy strategies, the increase of the external
interest rate reduces the capacity of domestic economies to finance their budget. The external
public debt-GPD ratio of all countries decreases after the shock. A higher Fed fund rate
means a higher U.S. Treasury bonds yield, which, in turn, means a higher EMBI Index and,
therefore, higher cost of borrowing for the studied economies. This phenomenon forces the
creation of domestic primary surpluses (variable def increases for all countries after the shock).16
Considering the precarious capacity of domestic economies to collect taxes, the surplus is likely
16A positive value of the def variable refers to a primary surplus situation; likewise, a negative value refers
to a primary deficit.
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to be created by a reduction in public spending (Ahmad and Brosio, 2008; Gavin and Perotti,
1997). The Brazilian economy is an exception. As the least-indebted country within the
UNASUR, Brazil’s debt and def-GDP ratios hardly react to the shock. As the sixth-largest
economy of the world, Brazil has no problems to finance its budget. Peru appears to have
no problems either, thanks to its high level of financial integration. Only 5% of the Peruvian
debt-GDP ratio (debt) fluctuation is explained by the shock, in contrast to more than 20% for
the other countries – including Chile. It is worth noting that in this case, Venezuela is not
unaffected. The reduction of Venezuela’s debt-GDP ratio (debt) is significant (30% explained
by the shock). Notwithstanding, Venezuela’s primary budget (def ) is not strongly affected; the
country’s huge oil reserves ensure the financing of its public budget.
3.2 Impact of a positive international trade shock
Insert Table 3 here
The South American continent is very rich in natural resources. For instance, Venezuela has
the second largest oil-reserves in the world.17 Chile is the main cooper and lithium producer.18
Bolivia holds the largest salt flat in the world (i.e., an enormous lithium reserve).19 Brazil is the
world’s leading exporter of coffee and Argentina is the world’s leading exporter of soy vegetable
oil, the second producer of soy meal and the third largest producer of soybean.20 Today, despite
the fact that the biggest economies (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia) have improved
their industrialization sector, the production of the so-called “commodities” continues to play
a main role. Table 3 shows the magnitude of the agricultural, fuel and mining sector as share of
the export of these sectors to the total export for the studied economies. More than 50% of the
export revenue of these economies derives from these two sectors. Therefore, these economies
are expected to be sensitive to variations in commodity prices. Specifically, a rise of this price is
supposed to increase revenues and employment in the concerned production sectors, boosting,
in turn, the real economy (Collier and Goderis 2012). This reasoning leads us to expect a direct
impact of commodity price on the real domestic production, which is indeed the case. Figure
17According to data on proven reserves of crude oil for 2011 from the CIA World Factbook.
18In 2010, Chile remained the world’s leading mined copper producer and accounted for 34% of the global
production. Moreover, in 2011, Chile reported 31% of the world’s lithium market (U.S. Geological Survey).
19According to the U.S. Geological Survey and the 2011 Minerals Yearbook.
20According to the Food and Agricultural Organization of United Nations, the International Coffee Organi-
zation, the World Trade Organization and the American Soybean Association.
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2 displays the results. The real output (y) of all countries responds positively and significantly
after an increase of commodity prices. Table 4 shows the high impact of the shock, which
explains more than 30% of the real GDP (y) variation in the most sensitive economies.
Insert Figure 2 and Table 4 here
Results indicate that some countries are more vulnerable than others depending on their
degree of openness and their specialization. Bolivia is the most vulnerable country (more than
35% of its real output variation is explained by the shock). Bolivia’s low level of industrial
exports and the fact that it is the commercially most-open country within the UNASUR (Table
3) makes it the most exposed economy after an external trade shock. Peru and Colombia also
react strongly (approximately 30% and 20%, respectively, of their real output fluctuation is due
to the shock) because of the importance of their fuel and mining production in their economic
system (Table 3). Brazil’s real output reaction is the most persistent reaction (it vanishes 12
periods after the shock), corroborating the relevance of the country’s oil and coffee production
despite its industrialization level. In contrast, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela appear to be less
vulnerable; their real sector reactions are short lived (Figure 2) and barely significant (Table
4). Argentina and Venezuela’s strict capital controls could be affecting their export sector.
Furthermore, Venezuela, as an OPEC member, cannot change its oil production in response
to market prices.21 Chile’s case is particularly interesting; the country is the least hit by the
shock despite its 74% of export revenue coming from the primary sector economy. This result
could be explained by the fact that before discovering the enormous lithium reserves in South
America, Chile’s exports of primary products had been decreasing compared to manufacturing
exports.
The increase in output causes an appreciation of the real exchange rate (variable rer de-
creases) except for Argentina and Venezuela that control their capital flows and which output
barely responds to the external disturbance, as above mentioned. The Bolivian monetary
authorities react by injecting money (m increment) to defend the parity. Within the FIT
economies, Peru and Colombia raise their nominal interest rates to prevent inflation after a
boost of their real supply. Furthermore, Brazil, similar to the former two countries, manip-
ulates the money aggregate to offset the rer appreciation confirming the “fear of floating” of
Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
21This is a main point considering that 95% of the Venezuelan export revenue comes from oil.
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The additional domestic wealth leads to budgetary surpluses (variable def increases), which
reduces the necessity of contracting more external debt (variable debt decreases). This impact
is stronger for the economies experiencing the biggest real output improvements, Bolivia and
Peru, whose primary surplus is 35% and 45%, respectively, due to the shock (Table 4).
3.3 Impact of a positive international financial shock
An international increase in price assets is expected to affect the real sector of the domestic
economies at least for three reasons. First, domestic equity holders – firms and households – will
experience wealth increases, which in turn enhances the volume of production and spending that
they will ultimately desire to undertake; this effect will enhance the real economy. Second, the
increase in price assets could affect domestic bank sheet balances resulting in credit expansion
and a consequent boost of economic activity. Third, the positive global investment environment
could provide incentives for new capital allocations in domestic economic and liquidity surpluses;
this phenomenon could impact banks’ ability to extend credit and thus real economic activity.
The above effects are closely related to the transmission channels between the financial and
real sector identified by literature, namely, the borrower balance sheet channel, the bank balance
sheet channel, and the liquidity channel (on Banking Supervision, 2011).
Insert Figure 3 and Table 5 here
Figure 3 and Table 5 display the results. Overall, the shock appears to exert a positive
impact on the real domestic GDP (y) of most UNASUR economies, as expected. Notwith-
standing, the boost of the domestic real sector after the external financial improvement is weak
and short-lived.
Except for Argentina and Venezuela, which restrict capital movements, the local real ex-
change rates appreciate significantly (Figure 3). Approximately 20% of the rer appreciation is
explicated by the shock for the most sensitive economies (Table 5) evidencing capital inflows.
However, these new capital allocations are barely translated into economic expansion (Real
GDP (y) responses are weak and fleeting).
Real exchange rate pressures force local domestic economies to react. Bolivia defends its
fixed regime by increasing aggregate money (m). Brazil and Peru follow the same strategy to
avoid a strong appreciation of their domestic currencies – the shock accounts for approximately
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13% and 14% of the rise in m, respectively – confirming the managed float condition. In
contrast, Colombia, Chile and Peru’s monetary authorities (inflation targeters) augment interest
rates (r) to avoid possible inflation expectations generated by a higher level of world asset prices.
This rise could explain the weak transfer of liquidity excess to the real economy.
Argentina and Venezuela’s case is particularly interesting, indicating that capital controls do
not necessarily protect the real sector from external financial shocks. As displayed by Figure
3, their real output (y) is highly impacted, even if they do not experience capital inflows.
The financial shock accounts for 20% of Venezuela’s and 9% of Argentina’s real production
improvement (Table 5). In this case, the boost of the real economy could be attributed to
domestic wealth effects.
Regarding fiscal concerns, the shock significantly reduces the domestic external debt (debt)
of most UNASUR economies. The shock explains approximately 20% of the external-debt ratio
(debt) fluctuation in the most-affected economies. It appears that the domestic wealth effect
reduces the necessity of acquiring new external financing. In fact, Figure 3 indicates that the
economies that experience capital inflows (rer appreciations) benefit from budget surpluses (def
contraction) and thereby from less external borrowing.
As evidenced by results, the studied economies are highly vulnerable to external distur-
bances. However, some countries are more sensitive than others in some cases and less harmed
in others. A while set of cases arise from the former analysis making it hard to distinguish com-
mon patterns among UNASUR members. Next section present evidence on coincident reactions
to shocks thus dealing with a main issue of Integration, convergence.
4 Co-movements: Correlation Analysis
The core aim of any economic integration process is the elimination of disparities between
national economies (Sapir 2011). The South American Integration project is not indifferent to
such a fundamental principle. In fact, Article 2 of the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty states that
part of the bloc’s main objective is “... to strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries
within the framework of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of the States”. The
reduction of asymmetries is indeed a goal. However, to what extent are the countries already
similar?
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As aforesaid, a number of common features (i.a., commodity producers, vulnerable to ex-
ternal disturbances) confronts to a number of individual features (i.a., monetary policy inde-
pendence, financial integration degree) among UNASUR members. A conclusion about their
actual state of synchronization is thus not straightforward. To shed some lights on this issue,
a correlation exercise is performed next. This traditional approach (e.g., Age´nor, McDermott,
and Prasad, 1999; Gimet, 2007b; Lee and Koh, 2012) will allow us to detect patterns of real (y
and rer), monetary (r and m) and fiscal (def and debt) convergence across the seven studied
UNASUR members. It is assumed that if the resulting correlation coefficient is positive, the
responses are considered to be symmetric, and if the correlation coefficient is negative, the
responses are considered to be asymmetric.
Table 6 reports average unconditional correlations coefficients among Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela’s series for three periods of time: 1993Q1 to 2010Q4
(whole sample), 1993Q1 to 2008Q3 (the period before the creation of UNASUR) and 2008Q4 to
2010Q4 (the period after UNASUR).22 Table 7 reports average conditional correlations among
the responses of variables after the three external shocks (increase in U.S. fed fund rate, increase
in commodity prices, increase of the MSCI financial index) based on the impulse response
functions recovered from the SVARs models. The denominations unconditional and conditional,
adopted for the correlation coefficients, refer to correlation coefficients among original series data
and correlation coefficients among variables’ responses subject to external shocks, respectively.
Insert Table 6 here
Table 6 provides a global panorama of the seven countries’ synchronization. Some interest-
ing facts are visible. First, an isolate glance over the entire sample reveals a null level of real
output (y) synchronization within the group of countries – the average correlation coefficient of
real output among the seven countries is only 0.08. However, such a low level is mostly driven
by the behavior of series before September 2008. The fragmentation of the sample reveals a pre-
UNASUR correlation degree of 0.05 against a post-UNASUR correlation degree of 0.43 among
real output. Second, contrary to the previous case, fiscal variables (def and debt) move more
similarly before the creation of UNASUR. However, the correlation levels of the deficit-GDP
and debt-GDP ratios are considerably high during the whole period, 0.36 and 0.5 respectively.
Third, despite the diversity of exchange rate regimes and monetary policy decisions of the
22The UNASUR Constitutive Treaty was signed on September 2008
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individual economies, the monetary variables astonishingly co-move among countries, correla-
tion even reach a 0.96 (whole sample) level for aggregate money (m). The previous facts are
rather positive for the UNASUR goal. Notwithstanding, the evidence provided by the uncondi-
tional correlations in Table 6 cannot be considered conclusive. The economic environment was
completely different during the nineties and 2000’s for the seven UNASUR countries, several
causes can thus be associated to the previous evolution of data. The studied economies were
severely touched by the rough economic conditions of the nineties, the Mexican crisis (1995),
the Asian and Russian crises (1997-1998), among others (See Frenkel and Rapetti (2012) for
a nice historical review). In contrast, most of them passed by the 2007-2009 Global Finan-
cial Crisis relatively unharmed (Boonman et al., 2011). Although several explanations for this
phenomenon have been postulated – i.a., improvements in external balance sheets (Ocampo,
2009), development of domestic bond markets (Jara et al., 2009) –, the undertaking of the
South American integration process cannot be neglected as a possible cause of the change in
trend. Then, even if not conclusive, the former evidence gives a good global picture in favor of
the UNASUR’s aim.
Insert Table 7 here
In order to further investigate the previous global panorama, conditional correlations, re-
ported in Table 7, are presented next. The impulse-response functions (IRF) recovered from
the SVAR framework allow us to isolate the effect of the external disturbances in each of the
variables for all countries. Therefore, correlation coefficients based on IRF allows us to provide
more accurate evidence about the synchronization level among the involved countries.
Average correlations, comparable with those of Table 6, are reported in column (8) of
Table 7. Real output (y) reactions after each of the three external shocks (See Panel I) are
considerable similar. Synchronization levels of 0.48, 0.25 and 0.30, corresponding to the real
output’ responses after an external monetary, trade and financial shock, respectively, noticeably
contrast to the overall 0.08 unconditional level but are consistent with the 0.43 post-UNASUR
unconditional level of synchronization. Short-run patterns of real output convergence are thus
confirmed in this case.
The same cannot be confirmed for monetary and fiscal variables’ reactions (See Panels II
and III in Table 7). The SVAR framework does take into account the dynamics provided by
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the diversity of monetary policy objectives adopted by the countries in the region. Therefore,
the correlations among the reactions of monetary variables’ responses after external shocks are
not as high as the previous 0.96 level. Even if a path cannot be clearly identified, because of
the negative coefficient corresponding to the responses of monetary variables after the external
trade disturbance, average coefficients superiors to zero (0.17 and 0.18 for r and m, respectively)
are a positive, although weak, signals pro-synchronization. The same is true for fiscal variables
co-movements.
Columns (1) to (7) in Table 7 report average conditional correlations by individual country.
The coefficients are computed as the average of all the possible pairwise combinations of each
country with each one of the rest involved UNASUR members. Results reveal that Brazil is
the less synchronized economy. Brazilian real and monetary responses after external shocks
are negatively correlated with those of the other UNASUR members (See column 3 – Panels I
and II in Table 7). To some extent, Brazil’s divergent reaction path is not surprising because
of its relative economic superiority, as detailed in sections 3.1 and 3.2. What is noteworthy
is that Brazilian monetary reactions are negatively correlated even with those of the other
FIT countries under analysis (i.e. Chile, Colombia and Peru). Column (9) in Table 7 reports
the degree of similarity between the responses of all FIT countries while Column (10) exclude
Brazil. The exclusion of Brazil from the FIT sub-grouping significantly changes the resulting
average correlation coefficient. For instance, the interest rate’s (r) synchronization degree of
FIT countries’ reactions after a monetary shock increases from 0.12 to 0.91 after the exclusion of
Brazil (See Panel II – Columns (9) and (10)). Moreover, the correlation coefficient of monetary
aggregate’s (m) responses among FIT economies after the trade and financial disturbances
passes from negative to positive when Brazil is taken off. According to Moura and de Carvalho
(2010)’s findings, Brazil pursues a “tough” monetary policy, whereas Chile, Peru and Colombia
pursue “mild” or “lax” monetary policies against inflation, such an assertion could explain
Brazil’s divergence with other FIT economies’ monetary reactions after shocks. On the other
hand, pegged-regime economies’ (i.e., Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela) monetary reactions
after external innovations are similar as well (See Column (11) in Table 7). However, an
overall convergent behavior is not as manifest as in the previous case. In general, none of the
other individual countries shows a divergent reaction path as the Brazilian one, the evidence
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supporting similarities in domestic reactions to external shocks is thus strong within the studied
UNASUR economies.
Overall, despite the different policy management and the particular conditions of its individ-
ual members, the former correlation exercise supports the existence of convergent paths within
the UNASUR’s key macroeconomic variables. Finally, it is worth to note that, at present, the
South American integration project is in its very embryonic stage. Therefore, the evidence
about a current considerable synchronization level reveals an enormous integration potential in
the region in the future. For instance, thanks to endogeneity concerns (i.e., post-similarities can
emerge within an integrated group even if prior -similarities are not fully manifested), monetary
convergence could be easier to achieve in the future if a monetary union arrangement is adopted
(e.g., Akiba and Iida, 2009; Frankel and Rose, 1998; Rose and Engel, 2002).
5 Relative Vulnerabilities
Historically, South American countries have been characterized as economic dependent na-
tions. Over time, these countries have taken a number of measures to change this condition
(Bulmer-Thomas, 2003). However, as indicated by the previous results (Section 3), despite
these measures they are still highly vulnerable to the external economic environment. Today,
their strategy is economic integration. To complement the description of the current state of
the UNASUR toward such integration, this section identifies the principal sources of fragility
by comparing the vulnerabilities of the studied countries.
As aforesaid, UNASUR countries are indeed vulnerable to external shocks. However, how
sensitive are these countries to financial relative to monetary or trade shocks? This relative
sensitivity matters to the extent that the individual members of the group seek a better way
to overcome difficulties through integration. Therefore, it is crucial to analyze what external
disturbance – monetary, commercial or financial – affects these countries the most.
Insert Figure 4 here
Figure 4 displays the real output responses of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Peru
and Venezuela after each of the included external disturbances. Visibly, the boost caused by
each of the three external disturbances is not homogeneous. In order to confirm quantitatively
any difference on the impact, the percentage of forecast error variance needs to be compared.
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Table 8 reports the percentage of forecast error variance explained by each external disturbance:
monetary, commercial and financial as an average of significant responses 16 periods after the
shock.
Panel I in Table 8 is the quantitative counterpart of Figure 4. In average, the domestic
economies appear to be more vulnerable to trade – 16.6% of the real output is explained by the
external disturbance – than to monetary and financial external shocks – 10.54% and 10.05%,
respectively. This result is not surprising considering that UNASUR economies are mainly
commodity producers. What is striking is that the external financial environment ranks as
least harmful. After a century with difficult episodes of financial crises in the South American
economies, this evidence is positive for the region. Notwithstanding, it is worth noting that the
low degree of financial integration in most countries, Venezuela and Argentina being the most
extreme cases, has influenced this result. Such a strategy is not sustainable if an economic
integration project is envisaged.23
Insert Table 8 here
Several interesting country-specific characteristics emerged from the comparative analysis
when considering the overall average by country as in Panel II of Table 8. Peru and Chile, the
most financially integrated economies, are highly sensitive to external financial disruptions –
11.9% of their vulnerability is accounted for by the financial shock. However, Peru is even more
vulnerable to international trade shocks – the trade shock explains 17.9% of Peru’s vulnerability.
A candidate explanations of such a difference is the considerable level of industry exports
(See Table 3) and the high technological capacity attributed to the Chilean economy(Molina-
Domene and Pietrobelli, 2012). Notwithstanding, Brazil, the most industrialized economy, is
also more vulnerable to trade shocks than to monetary and financial shocks – 19% of Brazil’s
vulnerability derives from trade disturbances, compared to 6% and 8% associated with monetary
and financial shocks, respectively. The former finding reveals two interesting facts. First, even
the less synchronized country of the group – i.e., Brazil – share a common relative vulnerability
with most of the studied UNASUR members. Second, although it is likely that a plan for
the improvement of the industrialization of South American exports (as the one implemented
23The integration theory (Balassa 1961) characterizes financial integration as a close complement to economic
integration. Moreover, the optimal currency area criteria – related to the fourth phase of economic integration –
highlight the importance of financial integration as part of the convergence process (Ingram 1962, Mc Kinnon
2001). More recently, the financial integration has proven to increase growth (Larrain 2011) and welfare (Lee
and Shin, 2012).
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in Latin America from the 1950’s to the 1980’s) will not be able to eliminate the group’s
vulnerability to external commercial conditions by itself, its inclusion as part of the whole
integration project of the UNASUR will certainly increase the expectations of reduction of
the South American vulnerable condition. Further research on the former will constitute a
significant contribution for the South American design.
The strategic feature of the commercial aspect is also highlighted by the Venezuelan case.
Despite the high dependence of its revenue on primary exports, Venezuela is less affected by
trade shocks compared to monetary and financial shocks. On average, only 9.35% of Venezuela’s
vulnerability is explained by trade shocks, in contrast to 11.17% and 10.33% explained by
monetary and financial external disturbances, respectively (See Panel II in Table 8). It appears
that the enormous Venezuelan oil resources reduce the country’s vulnerability to the external
commercial environment instead of increasing it. This phenomenon is not obvious considering
the high volatility of the oil market. What makes the difference is the considerable market power
of Venezuela (Reynolds and Pippenger, 2010), which empowers the country with a singular
advantage. This case of natural resources diminishing vulnerabilities instead of increasing
them is, however, not common in the UNASUR. Turning natural resources into an advantage
is undoubtedly another sizeable challenge for the integration project of the group.
A final peculiar case to note is the Argentinean one. Argentina is the only economy that
is more sensitive to monetary compared to trade and financial shocks. Of Argentina’s total
vulnerability, 14.8% comes from monetary external aspects, compared to approximately 6% that
comes from the commercial and financial external environment. Argentina’s pegged exchange
rate regime and the lack of confidence its citizens have into the national currency explain this
phenomenon. In fact, ten years after the 2001 crisis, the demand for foreign currency has not
decreased – an effect that has been amplified by the high inflation levels of the last years –
obliging the authorities to impose strict trade barriers.24 The fact that the monetary aspect
is highly sensitive for Argentina is certainly a pro-monetary integration aspect. Achieving the
fourth stage of economic integration, a monetary union, will thus be strategically important.
In general, the previous evidence indicate that, despite the fact that each individual UNA-
SUR member has its own weaknesses, they have mutual sources of vulnerability to fight against.
24See Frenkel and Rapetti (2007) for details about Argentina’s exchange rate policy after the convertibility
collapse. See also the CEPAL Work Document (2007) (Crisis, recuperacio´n y nuevos dilemas. La economı´a
argentina 2002-2007) for an evaluation of Argentina’s economic state after the 2001 crisis.
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Therefore, it is likely that all of these countries will benefit from a higher integration level by
reducing their vulnerabilities. This finding suggests that the decrease of vulnerabilities as a way
to lessen economic dependence could be an advantage of economic integration, which should
be considered by further theoretical research.
6 Conclusion
Three main conclusions are supported by results. First, the studied UNASUR members are
highly vulnerable to the external economic environment. Even the most closed (Argentina and
Venezuela) and the most industrialized economies (Brazil) are considerably impacted by exter-
nal disturbances. Therefore, vulnerability is common concern within the group. Second, con-
vergent short-run paths are present within the UNASUR’s key macroeconomic variables. The
unconditional correlation exercise suggests a higher synchronization degree among the stud-
ied countries after the UNASUR inception, while the conditional correlation exercise confirms
an important level of common reactions to external disturbances within the group. Consid-
ering the multiple specificities of the analyzed countries (e.g., exchange rate regimes, policy
objectives, financial and commercial integration degrees, industrialization levels), as well as
the embryonic stage of the South American integration project, the evidence about a current
considerable synchronization level reveals an enormous integration potential in the future. And
third, in average, domestic economies are more vulnerable to external trade disturbances than
to monetary and financial disturbances.
In addition to the previous main conclusions, it is worth to mention that, although Brazil
ranks as the lest synchronized economy, similarly to the rest of UNASUR members, it appears
to be relatively most vulnerable to the external trade environment. In other words, even the
country which could be categorized as the less interested to commit in a South American
integration plan shares potential gains from a regional plan because of its common relative
vulnerabilities with its partner countries. Therefore, the fight against external vulnerabilities
is a matter of common concern for UNASUR members and constitutes a main strong point of
the group.
The previous results provide a good panorama of the current situation of seven UNASUR
members as well as the future challenges and potential aspects of the group’s plan. The evidence
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presented here does not intent to be a final word on the topic, on the contrary, it is an opening
door for further research on the South American regional integration strategy. The UNASUR is
an interesting project barely investigated from an economic stand point, there are thus several
extensions to the present article. Just to mention a few, two extensions are proposed next. First,
a long-run analysis of convergence in the region, adopting a vector error correction approach for
instance, will complement the present short-run conclusions. Second, theoretical models could
be used to simulate the effects of implementing regional measures, as the adoption of a common
South American currency or a regional fiscal management/authority, in the convergence degree
of the UNASUR countries.
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Tables and Figures
Country Exchange Rate Regime Monetary Policy Objective
Argentina Crowling Bands Real Exchange Rate targeting
Bolivia Pegged with horizontal bands Monetary Aggregate Target
Brazil Managed Float Inflation Targeting since 1999
Chile Pure Float Inflation Targeting since 1990
Colombia Managed Float Inflation Targeting since 1991
Peru Managed Float Inflation Targeting since 2002
Venezuela Conventional fixed peg arrangement Nominal Exchange Rate targeting
Table 1: UNASUR Exchange Rate Regime and Monetary Policy Objectives
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions to an increase in the U.S. federal fund rate.
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Country Horizon Y RER R M DEF DEBT
Argentina 1 1.35 2.33 4.32 0.95 6.82 2.19
2 1.62 3.33 4.09 4.72 7.92 3.21
3 1.78 6.24 7.67 8.75 10.13 3.70
4 3.27 10.93 11.60 12.51 10.28 3.37
8 16.83 24.04 14.20 21.84 11.70 7.55
12 18.87 22.41 18.34 28.92 16.35 8.48
16 19.27 20.79 20.17 31.15 17.61 13.15
Bolivia 1 11.77 1.16 5.41 2.36 15.54 1.74
2 12.25 2.21 8.45 5.41 22.58 2.36
3 13.02 4.25 7.64 6.83 30.92 4.40
4 12.89 7.26 7.13 8.07 36.72 8.14
8 12.39 21.45 7.27 10.31 40.20 29.86
12 16.62 27.18 8.97 10.25 36.01 32.48
16 20.79 27.03 9.96 9.28 34.61 29.39
Brazil 1 3.80 2.12 3.51 2.72 12.00 2.43
2 6.22 3.25 3.71 3.53 11.00 6.43
3 5.76 4.01 4.44 4.62 9.32 7.46
4 5.12 4.71 4.81 5.14 10.05 8.37
8 6.15 5.85 5.86 6.19 10.68 8.16
12 6.97 7.39 6.27 7.14 11.08 9.12
16 7.47 8.19 6.50 7.84 11.31 9.54
Chile 1 7.16 1.06 2.26 3.48 1.93 0.96
2 11.79 1.51 3.29 2.95 4.44 2.76
3 14.33 2.16 3.72 2.76 9.74 6.99
4 16.14 2.96 4.19 2.88 15.63 12.02
8 15.46 4.99 7.89 3.98 26.27 24.41
12 15.08 7.05 8.98 5.02 25.39 24.02
16 15.93 9.31 9.81 5.79 24.32 22.40
Colombia 1 2.15 18.96 0.86 0.98 0.97 7.61
2 6.63 20.92 1.47 2.99 2.70 12.56
3 10.48 21.45 2.29 2.99 3.06 18.57
4 11.69 20.76 3.42 2.89 3.83 23.66
8 10.93 17.18 10.15 4.12 7.87 28.06
12 11.09 16.85 15.73 7.04 8.10 22.48
16 12.46 16.83 17.88 9.92 9.45 20.24
Peru 1 1.42 1.03 1.35 2.64 0.94 1.32
2 2.60 1.36 2.10 3.73 1.71 2.25
3 3.94 1.71 3.72 4.19 3.01 3.52
4 5.45 2.07 6.56 4.43 4.94 4.98
8 9.05 3.67 22.52 5.09 13.82 8.53
12 10.35 5.45 25.63 6.00 16.96 9.46
16 11.13 6.93 23.88 6.60 17.24 10.22
Venezuela 1 0.92 2.66 0.90 1.00 0.93 1.33
2 1.36 3.04 3.09 5.42 2.19 2.92
3 1.92 3.20 6.87 11.08 3.86 5.07
4 2.56 3.39 10.38 15.68 5.85 8.78
8 4.17 4.64 13.57 17.82 11.80 28.22
12 6.77 6.44 14.44 12.99 11.99 31.46
16 10.45 8.50 14.60 10.43 12.01 29.04
Table 2: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition after an increase in the U.S. federal fund rate.
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Sector Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Peru Venezuela
Agricultural 0.51 0.17 0.34 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.01
Fuel and mining 0.12 0.75 0.28 0.64 0.58 0.50 0.95
Manufactures 0.32 0.07 0.35 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.02
Openness Index 0.40 0.76 0.23 0.70 0.34 0.48 0.46
Notes: Table displays data for 2010 from the World Trade Organization. The
Openness Index has been computed as the ratio (exports+ imports)/GPD.
Table 3: Exports decomposition by sector as share of total for 2010 and openness index computed
from World Trade Organization Data
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions to an increase in commodity prices.
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Country Horizon Y RER R M DEF DEBT
Argentina 1 3.98 5.60 1.46 5.55 2.57 0.82
2 11.00 3.77 3.42 2.89 3.58 1.89
3 7.78 2.83 5.15 2.95 4.89 2.29
4 5.76 3.13 5.97 3.41 5.71 2.38
8 7.40 7.41 9.62 3.55 5.81 4.90
12 8.18 8.12 9.89 4.17 6.75 6.96
16 8.12 8.24 9.82 5.16 7.16 6.84
Bolivia 1 24.27 1.12 0.84 14.80 22.94 0.89
2 36.57 2.28 3.16 28.80 26.91 3.16
3 37.83 7.45 3.64 35.53 29.29 7.45
4 36.05 15.63 4.24 38.51 31.14 12.00
8 29.09 37.81 8.21 37.85 35.02 30.09
12 26.64 43.61 9.30 34.39 34.18 37.82
16 26.72 44.50 10.22 29.66 32.72 39.09
Brazil 1 9.37 10.41 1.39 1.32 5.76 5.56
2 9.62 18.33 2.35 3.94 6.27 7.97
3 9.87 22.33 3.14 5.42 7.04 15.29
4 11.21 25.69 3.97 5.83 8.04 24.50
8 23.07 40.14 5.58 9.34 9.28 45.00
12 23.47 46.00 6.34 11.87 10.68 49.87
16 21.91 47.61 6.72 13.30 11.53 50.55
Chile 1 14.70 17.34 5.05 8.81 0.92 2.62
2 9.27 12.70 4.80 7.09 2.24 2.51
3 6.39 9.23 5.94 5.57 2.79 2.43
4 5.58 8.16 6.64 4.87 3.68 2.51
8 5.07 6.61 6.97 4.55 5.22 3.89
12 5.61 6.23 6.94 4.62 5.67 4.70
16 6.17 6.33 6.82 4.68 5.91 5.03
Colombia 1 3.42 34.44 0.90 0.86 2.86 10.15
2 15.57 23.26 1.25 3.68 4.49 15.74
3 19.86 17.15 1.82 3.75 5.94 23.53
4 18.16 17.32 2.71 3.35 7.91 29.12
8 12.98 18.69 7.84 4.13 9.06 25.81
12 11.75 18.30 9.43 4.61 8.67 18.06
16 11.13 18.12 9.55 4.76 8.71 14.45
Peru 1 9.82 9.47 1.10 8.78 2.04 1.10
2 29.18 13.00 1.57 14.38 5.86 2.91
3 31.94 12.58 2.62 13.90 15.06 10.83
4 29.51 11.92 4.84 11.37 27.12 18.12
8 19.08 10.38 13.99 7.76 44.56 21.93
12 16.36 10.42 15.41 7.47 41.84 20.51
16 15.28 10.78 15.08 7.48 39.47 18.87
Venezuela 1 4.69 2.58 4.41 1.6 1.86 0.98
2 7.91 4.69 8.93 5.24 6.51 1.22
3 8.25 5.49 12.47 10.61 11.25 1.63
4 7.55 5.38 14.87 15.37 14.61 2.11
8 6.49 6.25 15.06 16.77 15.4 5.24
12 6.49 7.39 14.11 12.31 12.73 7.03
16 7.08 8.52 13.44 9.54 11.4 7.2
Table 4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition after an increase in commodity prices.
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions to an increase in international asset prices.
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Country Horizon Y RER R M DEF DEBT
Argentina 1 8.74 1.02 0.80 4.85 4.32 4.67
2 6.99 2.78 1.94 7.56 5.41 5.94
3 6.76 2.57 3.24 6.52 5.68 5.04
4 5.69 2.44 3.67 5.93 5.88 4.70
8 5.54 2.99 4.68 4.62 6.61 6.26
12 6.49 4.16 5.54 3.90 6.84 8.99
16 7.33 5.69 6.09 3.76 7.09 12.65
Bolivia 1 2.40 1.28 0.95 2.27 7.89 0.84
2 5.11 2.45 4.85 5.41 14.07 1.90
3 5.01 5.06 8.72 4.56 15.66 4.75
4 5.35 7.23 10.35 3.97 16.27 9.30
8 8.50 9.51 9.92 3.69 13.91 16.23
12 12.30 8.07 9.60 4.53 14.32 13.01
16 13.24 7.29 9.59 6.20 16.28 12.19
Brazil 1 1.06 11.80 0.82 1.01 3.67 0.76
2 1.66 13.86 1.76 2.62 10.01 2.11
3 1.92 12.65 3.14 3.60 10.81 4.50
4 2.58 10.65 3.85 5.18 10.68 5.57
8 4.09 8.92 4.85 11.26 10.94 6.16
12 5.03 8.44 5.10 13.76 11.26 6.30
16 6.46 8.19 5.21 15.26 11.43 6.49
Chile 1 2.71 18.08 1.46 1.24 3.85 2.50
2 7.62 22.61 3.07 1.86 11.68 3.86
3 7.19 21.86 4.28 2.04 16.01 7.95
4 6.14 19.98 6.51 2.27 18.06 12.78
8 8.30 15.26 8.81 4.74 16.87 20.04
12 13.36 17.52 9.29 5.79 16.44 18.62
16 16.05 21.86 10.95 6.52 16.68 18.04
Colombia 1 0.96 5.98 1.03 1.05 0.9 1.01
2 2.88 10.93 1.60 1.48 2.69 4.34
3 3.25 10.21 2.23 1.59 3.11 9.41
4 3.39 9.16 2.97 1.74 3.62 14.7
8 4.03 9.82 7.39 2.68 4.42 16.92
12 5.43 12.00 10.33 4.23 5.46 12.31
16 7.14 12.65 11.02 5.63 6.83 11.37
Peru 1 4.92 4.11 3.57 11.77 0.83 1.19
2 11.52 4.97 3.36 18.77 1.49 1.72
3 14.38 4.89 6.05 17.66 3.75 2.51
4 14.47 4.78 12.78 15.3 7.82 3.52
8 11.93 5.40 27.31 10.36 13.50 5.20
12 11.26 6.08 23.55 9.00 13.17 6.02
16 10.9 6.59 20.73 8.07 13.26 6.56
Venezuela 1 12.85 2.87 0.86 1.24 0.92 12.64
2 15.47 2.52 1.50 1.45 1.94 8.28
3 17.08 2.62 1.95 1.66 2.86 6.42
4 18.61 2.85 2.61 1.95 3.90 7.68
8 20.62 4.53 4.96 3.25 6.73 17.39
12 17.4 6.15 6.91 4.40 7.65 20.22
16 16.44 7.66 7.87 5.42 8.44 19.32
Table 5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition after an increase in international asset prices.
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Real Monetary Fiscal
y rer r m def debt
Whole sample 0.08 0.38 0.45 0.96 0.36 0.50
Before UNASUR 0.05 0.41 0.44 0.92 0.40 0.41
After UNASUR 0.43 0.31 0.85 0.71 0.19 0.16
Notes: The table reports unconditional pairwise correlation coefficients among
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela’s log-real output
(y), log-real exchange rate (rer), nominal interest rate (r), log-aggregate money
(m), public deficit-GDP ratio (def ) and external public debt-GDP ratio (debt)
original series. Coefficients are reported as the average of all the possible pairwise
combinations between the seven countries.
Table 6: Average unconditional correlation coefficients among key macroeconomic variables
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By Country By Exch. Rate?
AR BO BR CH CO PE V E All FITa FITb FX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel I. Real Responses
(y) Mon 0.34 0.57 0.16 0.69 0.68 0.21 0.68 0.48 0.37 0.53 0.59
Trade 0.40 0.51 -0.21 -0.40 0.53 0.46 0.48 0.25 -0.14 0.05 0.73
Fin 0.44 0.44 -0.70 0.54 0.55 0.42 0.41 0.30 0.08 0.78 0.63
Average 0.39 0.51 -0.25 0.28 0.59 0.36 0.52
(rer) Mon 0.23 -0.14 -0.11 0.07 -0.16 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.07 -0.19 0.34
Trade 0.02 -0.03 -0.17 0.15 -0.01 -0.24 -0.05 -0.05 -0.11 0.45 -0.01
Fin 0.31 -0.31 0.25 0.38 0.29 0.26 -0.42 0.11 0.90 0.91 0.21
Average 0.18 -0.16 -0.01 0.20 0.04 0.01 -0.18
Panel II. Monetary Responses
(r) Mon 0.47 0.52 -0.33 0.33 0.46 0.35 0.43 0.32 0.12 0.91 0.83
Trade 0.04 0.24 -0.12 0.00 0.31 0.36 -0.07 0.11 0.10 0.35 -0.14
Fin 0.26 -0.08 -0.05 0.12 0.3 0.09 -0.03 0.09 0.31 0.66 0.31
Average 0.26 0.23 -0.16 0.15 0.36 0.27 0.11 0.17
(m) Mon 0.25 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.45 0.3 0.36 0.27 0.26 0.57 0.14
Trade -0.18 0.04 0.01 -0.23 -0.13 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 0.37 0.06
Fin 0.55 0.58 -0.77 0.55 0.57 0.40 0.49 0.34 -0.02 0.75 0.84
Average 0.21 0.26 -0.20 0.18 0.29 0.23 0.27 0.18
Panel III. Fiscal Responses
(def) Mon 0.07 0.54 0.13 0.56 0.52 0.34 0.51 0.38 0.35 0.73 0.29
Trade -0.31 0.18 0.04 -0.31 -0.02 0.09 0.16 -0.03 -0.20 -0.30 -0.18
Fin 0.19 0.48 0.25 0.64 0.48 0.51 0.59 0.45 0.43 0.70 0.24
Average -0.02 0.40 0.14 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.42 0.27
(debt) Mon 0.65 0.15 0.18 0.72 0.66 0.67 0.63 0,52 0.73 0.91 0.67
Trade -0.25 0.01 0.12 -0.20 -0.10 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.12 -0.31
Fin 0.16 0.59 0.49 0.69 0.67 0.62 0.34 0.51 0.75 0.81 0.12
Average 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.40 0.41 0.44 0.32 0.33
? (FIT1) Within FIT (Floating Inflation Tarjeters) countries – Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru. (FITb) Within
FIT excluding Brazil – Chile, Colombia, Peru. (FX) Within Fixed Regimen Economies – Argentina, Bolivia,
Venezuela.
———————————————————-
Notes: The table reports the correlation coefficient of real output (y), real exchange rate
(rer), nominal interest rate (r), aggregate money (m), public deficit-GDP ratio (def ) and
external public debt-GDP ratio (debt) reactions between Argentina (AR), Bolivia (BO),
Brazil (BR), Chile (CH), Colombia (CO), Peru(PE) and Venezuela(VE) after three external
shocks: i) increase in the US. fed fund rate (Mon), ii) increase in commodity prices (Trade)
and iii) increase in international asset prices (Fin).
Table 7: Average pairwise correlations of responses after external disturbances
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Real output responses to external disturbances
Monetary
Trade
Financial
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Peru Venezuela
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Figure 4: Real Output responses to external disturbances.
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Shock AR BO BR CH CO PE V E Average
Panel I. Real Output
(y) Monetary 13.38 15.56 5.26 14.22 9.05 6.30 10.02 10.54
Trade 7.62 29.49 17.70 14.70 14.25 25.30 7.10 16.60
Financial 7.05 10.22 6.46 11.35 5.01 11.79 18.52 10.05
Panel II. Overall Average
Monetary 14.80 18.64 5.59 11.28 12.27 8.96 11.17
Trade 6.29 27.42 19.01 9.07 12.54 17.87 9.35
Financial 5.75 9.79 8.09 11.93 8.57 11.98 10.33
Notes: The table reports the average percentage of the variance of real output (y),
real exchange rate (rer), nominal interest rate (r), aggregate money (m), public
deficit-GDP ratio (def ) and external public debt-GDP ratio (debt) in Argentina
(AR), Bolivia (BO), Brazil (BR), Chile (CH), Colombia (CO), Peru (PE) and
Venezuela(VE) explained by external monetary, trade and financial shocks. The
percentage is reported as an average of significant responses 16 periods after the shock.
Table 8: Relative contribution of external shocks
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